My excerpts from the Hussman Funds’ Weekly Market Comment (6/28/10):
[bold emphasis mine]
Based on evidence that has always and only been observed during or immediately prior to U.S. recessions, the U.S. economy appears headed into a second leg of an unusually challenging downturn.
..the U.S. economy is most probably either in, or immediately entering a second phase of contraction. Of course, the evidence could be incorrect in this instance, but the broader economic context provides no strong basis for ignoring the present warning in the hope of a contrary outcome. Indeed, if anything, credit conditions suggest that we should allow for outcomes that are more challenging than we have typically observed in the post-war period.
..following systemic banking crises, the duration of housing price declines has averaged roughly six years, while the downturn in equity prices has averaged about 3.4 years. On average, unemployment rises for almost 5 years. If we mark the beginning of this crisis in early 2008 with the collapse of Bear Stearns, it seems rather hopeful to view the March 2009 market low as a durable “V” bottom for the stock market, and to expect a sustained economic expansion to happily pick up where last year’s massive dose of “stimulus” spending now trails off. The average adjustment periods following major credit strains would place a stock market low closer to mid-2011, a peak in unemployment near the end of 2012 and a trough in housing perhaps by 2014. Given currently elevated equity valuations, widening credit spreads, deteriorating market internals, and the rapidly increasing risk of fresh economic weakness, there is little in the current data to rule out these extended time frames.
In recent months, I have finessed this issue by encouraging investors to carefully examine their risk exposures. I’m not sure that finesse is helpful any longer. The probabilities are becoming too high to use gentle wording. Though I usually confine my views to statements about probability and “average” behavior, this becomes fruitless when every outcome associated with the data is negative, with no counterexamples. Put bluntly, I believe that the economy is again turning lower, and that there is a reasonable likelihood that the U.S. stock market will ultimately violate its March 2009 lows before the current adjustment cycle is complete. At present, the best argument against this outcome is that it is unthinkable. Unfortunately, once policy makers have squandered public confidence, the market does not care whether the outcomes it produces are unthinkable. Unthinkability is not evidence.
Based on our standard valuation methods, the S&P 500 Index would have to drop to about 500 to match historical post-war points of secular undervaluation, such as June 1950, September 1974, and July 1982. We do not have to contemplate outcomes such as April 1932 (when the S&P 500 dropped to just 2.8 times its pre-Depression earnings peak) to allow for the possibility of further market difficulty in the coming years. Even strictly post-war data is sufficient to establish that the lows we observed in March 2009 did not represent anything close to generational undervaluation. We face real, structural economic problems that will not go away easily, and it is important to avoid the delusion that the average valuations typical of the recent bubble period represent sustainable norms.
{comments on holding Gold right now}
From an inflation standpoint, is important to recognize the distinction between what occurs during a credit crisis and what occurs afterward. Credit strains typically create a nearly frantic demand for government liabilities that are considered default-free (even if they are subject to inflation risk). This raises the marginal utility of government liabilities relative to the marginal utility of goods and services. That’s an economist’s way of saying that interest rates drop and deflation pressures take hold. Commodity price declines are also common, which is a word of caution to investors accumulating gold here, who may experience a roller-coaster shortly.
In bonds, the Market Climate last week was characterized by moderately unfavorable yield levels and favorable yield pressures. Credit spreads continue to widen, and we’ve observed a flattening of the yield curve due to a flight-to-safety in default free instruments. This may seem like an odd outcome, given that the growing issuance of Treasury and Fed liabilities is gradually setting us up for a difficult inflationary period beginning in the second half of this decade, but it is a strong regularity that “default-free” beats “inflation prone” during periods of crisis. For that same reason, we have to be careful about concluding that the growth of government liabilities will quickly translate into continued appreciation in precious metals and other commodities. Again, the historical regularity is for commodities to decline, though with a lag, once credit difficulties emerge. My weekly comments on this front might be less redundant if there were more subtlety to the issue, but it is subtle enough to recognize that the long-term inflationary implications of current monetary and fiscal policies will not necessarily translate into negative short-term outcomes for the Treasury market, nor persistently positive short-term outcomes for commodities.
[Commentary]
I currently own no stocks, and the momentum system has me in long-term treasury bonds, which agrees with above. Also agrees with my commentary on Gold.
I do plan on purchasing two new stocks tomorrow, which are too cheap to ignore and are already visiting their March 2009 lows.
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